Abstract-Security assurance in a computer system can be viewed as distinguishing between self and non-self. Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are a class of machine learning (ML) techniques inspired by the behavior of innate biological immune systems, which have evolved to accurately classify self-behavior from non-self-behavior. This work aims to leverage AIS-based ML techniques for identifying certain behavioral traits in high level hardware descriptions, including unsafe or undesirable behaviors, whether such behavior exists due to human error during development, or due to intentional, malicious circuit modifications, known as hardware Trojans, without the need for a golden reference model. We explore the use of Negative Selection and Clonal Selection, which have historically been applied to malware detection on software binaries, to detect potentially unsafe or malicious behavior in hardware. We present a software tool which analyzes Trojan-inserted benchmarks, extracts their control and data-flow graphs (CDFGs), and uses this to train an AIS behavior model, against which new hardware descriptions may be tested. The proposed model is capable of detecting the specified (Trojan or Trojan-like) behavior with an accuracy of 85% and an average false negative rate of 12.6% for Negative Selection and 12.8% for Clonal Selection.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the major challenges in hardware security is the detection of hardware Trojans. Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications to an Integrated Circuit (IC) that change the original, desired functionality and can perform a wide range of undesirable or unsafe actions, such as leaking information to an attacker, or causing system failure under specific conditions determined by the Trojan designer. Trojans may be inserted at any phase of the IC design cycle, including in high level circuit descriptions, or during fabrication in a foundry. Broadly, Trojans may be viewed as intentional faults, where the faulty behavior is difficult to model, since it is the product of a human designer, rather than a naturally arising error caused by physical processes in fabrication. For Trojans in logic or memory circuits, the payload, or faulty behavior, may be activated by certain input combinations or sequences of input combinations, triggering the undesirable or faulty behavior [1] .
These rare triggering events are usually designed to be stealthy and undetectable during simulation and test. Detecting these malicious events usually requires a golden reference model [2] that is guaranteed to be Trojan-free. However, this may not be available, especially as Intellectual Property (IP) cores in recent times are mostly licensed from typically untrusted third-party vendors. Another disadvantage is that using a golden reference as the basis for detection may be inconclusive or too complex for exhaustive verification, especially for large designs [2] . More recently, researchers have proposed detection methodologies that do not require a golden reference model. Narasimhan et al. used a combination of functional testing and side-channel analysis to measure the transient current signature for multiple time frames under invariable state transitions [3] . This technique is effective when the knowledge of the activation time of the Trojan is known. The work by Chakraborty et al. is based on statistical vector generation wherein rare circuit nodes are triggered numerous times by the test vectors, uncovering Trojans hidden in these rare nodes [4] . This can provide valuable insight as to where in the circuit a Trojan may be hidden, and it can be a beneficial tool for finding Trojans at lower levels of abstraction.
For designs still at high levels of abstraction, however, alternative techniques are required to determine whether or not unsafe behavior exists. Zhang and Tehranipoor proposed combining multiple stages of verification, including codecoverage analysis, assertion checking, equivalence analysis, removal of redundant circuits, and sequential Automatic Test Pattern Generation (ATPG) to recognize suspicious signals [5] . Fern et al. utilize Mutation Testing to detect Trojans inserted in unspecified functionality, i.e. "don't care" clauses, which may escape detection through traditional verification techniques relying on a formal specification [6] .
Instead of looking for Trojans only in rare nodes, or in unspecified functionality, the goal of this work is to develop a system which is capable of recognizing certain behavioral traits in a circuit, and classifying these traits either as benign or as containing potentially unsafe operations. A design that contains potentially unsafe operations may be compromised, either intentionally with malicious modifications / Trojan insertions, or unintentionally through human error. Regardless, the ability to accurately classify such behavior for any given design would enable IP designers to quickly verify the security of their own work, or system integrators to check third party IP (3PiP) cores used in larger designs. While other previously discussed techniques would still be applicable at lower levels of abstraction, the ability to quickly analyze a design for unsafe behavior in RTL could save significant time and cost if a Trojan were discovered earlier in the design flow.
Our work leverages Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) [7] , [8] , extending the concept of distinguishing between self and non-self behavior for the purpose of circuit behavior classification. AIS has been widely and successfully used in malware detection in software [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , where sequences of instructions may be considered "unsafe" and may be indicative of malware, as well as pattern recognition and optimization [13] , [14] . Negative Selection (NSA) [7] and Clonal Selection (CSA) [15] Algorithms are used to identify behavioral patterns in Control and Dataflow Graphs (CDFGs) extracted from behavioral Verilog HDL circuit descriptions.
978-1-5386-5541-2/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE The models are trained on RTL Trojan benchmarks obtained from TrustHub.org [16] . The CDFGs are extracted using PyVerilog [17] , an open-source Verilog code parser and static analyzer tool, though any CDFG extraction tool may be used. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that AIS can successfully discriminate between designs containing safe and unsafe behavior, by recognizing patterns in Trojan-inserted designs and matching against the design under test.
In short, this paper makes the following novel contributions: 1) It frames the problem of detecting unsafe behavior in RTL in terms of detecting self-vs non-self-behavior in the design's control and data flow.
2) It presents a complete software tool flow for AIS-based RTL source code analysis, including model generation and behavior classification. 3) It analyzes the efficacy of Negative Selection using partial or whole string matching and Clonal Selection algorithms on binary-encoded CDFGs. 4) It demonstrates how machine learning can be used to detect unsafe behavior in Trojan-included hardware, even if the specific instance of the Trojan has not been previously encountered -similar to an immune system that responds to a foreign cell in the body, even if it has not encountered that specific virus or bacteria before. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first application of AIS to hardware Trojan detection at a high level of abstraction. The rest of our paper is organized as follows: In Section II we discuss the background on recent hardware Trojan detection techniques using Machine Learning concepts (Section II-A) and introduce a formal definition of an Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) and its algorithms (Section II-B). Sections III and IV discuss the proposed Trojan detection methodology and experiments, experimental results, and future work.
II. BACKGROUND
This section summarizes existing ML-based Trojan detection techniques, though these are primarily anomaly detectors on side channel data. Next, we describe the AIS algorithms used in this work for circuit behavior classification.
A. ML-based HT Detection Approaches
Several machine learning-based techniques have previously been proposed for Trojan detection, though these primarily seek to identify anomalies and classify circuits based on side channel measurements. One such technique proposed by Iwase et al. [18] is a machine learning classification technique which is trained on differing power consumption to identify Trojan-free or Trojan-inserted designs in AES circuit. They used Discrete Fourier Transforms to convert acquired power consumption waveform data from the time domain to frequency domain as features to train the SVM. This technique requires a golden reference model.
Another ML classification technique proposed by Lodhi et al. [19] uses a combination of timing signatures and classification algorithms for detecting HTs. They implemented a self-learning framework which uses their proposed macro synchronous micro asynchronous (MSMA) signature technique for feature extraction. A golden reference model is again used to extract features from MSMA which are then used to train KNN, decision trees, and Bayesian Classifiers.
A ML technique that does not classify circuits based on side channel measurements but requires a golden model is proposed in [20] , the IC's physical layout is extracted using reverse engineering and imaging techniques. Resulting scans of the IC layers are analyzed, and an SVM is trained to characterize Trojan-inserted and Trojan-free structures in the IC using features obtained from the imaging procedure. This RE technique does not require the need for generating a transistor or gate netlist, but requires high resolution, low noise scans for accurate classification. This may become more challenging with future process technologies and smaller feature sizes.
Other ML techniques that do no require a golden reference model and are not based on side channel measurement are proposed by Hasegawa et al. [21] and Ova et al. [22] . These include an SVM classifier trained to detect Trojans in a gate level netlist, using features such as flip-flop input/output and primary input/output for training, finding that dynamic weighting for SVM training gives an accuracy of 80% [21] . Alternatively, Oya et al. used a score-based classification technique for discerning between Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted netlists. Instead of identifying a netlist as an HT-inserted circuit, they focus on finding Trojan nets within these designs to classify it as a HT-inserted design. This approach enabled successful Trojan detection in certain TrustHub benchmarks.
FANCI [23] and VeriTrust [24] are two other state-of-theart techniques that use non-ML-based design stage verification on gate-level netlists. FANCI utilizes "control values" which depicts how the functionality of certain wires in the IC affects other wires to identify malicious wires that carry potential backdoor trigger signals. VeriTrust uses "tracers" and "checkers" to look for redundant inputs (suspicious Trojan signals) and determine if signals are carried by redundant inputs.
This paper uses Artificial Immune Systems (AIS), an alternative class of ML techniques which have been widely used for malware detection in software. We do not consider side channel data or logic functions, and do not require simulation or silicon measurements of any kind. Instead, we aim to classify high level behavioral traits in a circuit, based on its control flow and data flow graph (CDFG), to detect the presence of unsafe and unwanted operations. Implementation specifics are abstracted out at the CDFG level, and the CDFG encapsulates both sequential (control flow) and combinational (data flow) behavior, enabling detection of RTL Trojans.
B. Artificial Immune Systems
The field of computational neuroscience developed for theoretical analysis and modeling of biological neural systems. Inspired by biological immune system, Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are an upcoming paradigm based on computational intelligence. The research on AIS has resulted in many noteworthy algorithms and their application to real world problems, including anomaly detection, pattern recognition, and optimization. In biological immune systems, the role of the immune system is that of a protector, wherein it fights and removes destructive micro-organisms such as bacteria or viruses and returns the body to a healthy state.
AIS is based on the theory that immune systems distinguish the pathogen (any malicious entity) as non-self and the body's cells (benign entities) as self. These immune system inspired concepts of antibodies (self and benign entity) and antigens (malicious and non-self entity) are applied to the computational understanding of malicious and normal behavior of the system for accurate anomaly detection. Three fundamental immunological theories are the basis of AIS -clonal selection, negative selection and immune networks. The research focus has been on learning and memory mechanisms of the immune system and anomalous entity detection using Negative and Clonal Selection Algorithms.
1) Negative Selection Algorithm: The Negative Selection Algorithm (NSA) consists of two phases: the detector generation (training) phase, and the detector application (testing) phase. These two phases can also be referred to as the censoring and monitoring phases, respectively [7] . The censoring phase results in the generation of mature detectors that can be used for detecting non-self behavior.
Subsequently, the system being protected is monitored for changes by the detectors generated in the censoring stage. The algorithm first defines a set of self-examples denoted by S self . The data that is to be protected (contained within S self ) is viewed in terms of a binary-encoded string. The string is then split into several l-length substrings which makes up the set of self data. First, we generate a set of candidate detectors R of a specified length l from the binary encoded string of CDFGs obtained from the selected Trojan benchmarks. This is then used to generate a set of competent detectors in the censoring phase. Traditionally, random string generation is used to build the candidate detector set. However, using real examples to build the detector set reduces the likelihood of false negatives. Strings from R that match the self-set S self are eliminated from further consideration. However, the strings that do not match any of the strings in S self become members of the detector set collection S non−self . This is repeated until all substrings in R have been compared to those in S self . During testing, changes to self are monitored by continually choosing each detector in R and testing to see if it matches with strings in S non−self . If the self-string matches one of the detector strings in S non−self , a change is indicated in S self .
2) Clonal Selection Algorithm: The Clonal Selection Algorithm [15] is mainly used for pattern recognition and optimization [13] . It works by producing antibody memory cells that mutate when they encounter antigens, and consequently acquire the characteristics of these antigens over time. A process called affinity maturation [25] , a similarity measure, is used to search for the final set of antibodies. The maturation rate is directly proportional to the affinity of the cell to the encountered antigen. The cells then mutate to form clones and acquire the characteristics of the antigen. Long-term exposure of these memory cells leads to the final pool of memory cells that consist of all the antigen characteristics they were exposed to, resulting in an optimized pool of memory cells.
The algorithm initially generates a random set of antibodies (self-examples) R Ab of fixed size, which is then divided into a memory subset S self of detector clones and a subset of remaining clones. The process of generation takes place, where these R Ab set of antibodies are iteratively exposed to a pool of antigens R Ag (non-self examples). Affinity maturation is then applied on a select antigen from R Ag and affinity values are collected by measuring their Hamming distance. The antibodies with the highest affinity to the subjected antigens are cloned. The process of affinity maturation is then repeated on the cloned antibodies to measure their new affinity values, where clones with a lower degree of maturation undergo higher mutation and vice-versa. The clones with the highest degree of affinity maturation are then saved in the detector memory subset S self and the clones with the lowest degree of affinity maturation are replaced with other samples from R Ab .
III. DETECTION METHODOLOGY The Negative Selection Algorithm and Clonal Selection
Algorithm are used in the detection of hardware Trojans inserted in a high level circuit model, specifically behavioral Verilog HDL. Briefly, a static analysis tool is used to generate a Control and Data-flow Graph (CDFG) from which features are extracted. For training and testing purposes, we use a set of RTL benchmarks from TrustHub labeled as either Trojaninserted (malicious) or Trojan-free (benign).
A. CDFG Generation and Feature Extraction
The control and data-flow graphs of a program represent the internal sequence of operations that are performed to execute the program. A control-flow graph [26] provides a representation of all the paths that can be traversed through a program during its execution. In this graph, nodes represent basic blocks that express a sequence of consecutive statements, and edges represent any possible flow of control from one node to another. A data-flow graph [27] represents the data dependencies between different operations that a program performs and can be viewed as a fundamental expression of a computational structure.
Thus, a CDFG fully encapsulates the behavior of the design, including any potentially unsafe or undesired behavior, regardless of how such behavior was incorporated into the design. The underlying assumption, then, is that the CDFG is wholly and correctly extracted from the source. By training an AIS to recognize patterns in the CDFG as potentially unsafe, whether the intent is malicious or not, it can detect non-self behavior in RTL. Furthermore, through the use of AIS and the evolutionary nature of the learning process, we propose that by training on example Trojan-included CDFGs, similar (if not exact) behavior in other designs may also be identified; thus, the training itself need not be comprehensive to have a high degree of accuracy on previously unencountered Trojans.
PyVerilog is used to generate CDFGs for each benchmark. It initially constructs an abstract syntax tree representation from behavioral Verilog code. Tree traversal method is implemented in the design hierarchy to define signal scope and determine all parameters and constants. It then builds an assignment tree for every signal in the code to provide a complete representation of the control and data flow.
For our experiments, we use a total of 50 Trojan-free and 44 Trojan-inserted RTL benchmarks (Table I ). The Trojan behavior ranges from making malicious functional changes to leak data or manipulate instruction registers, to activating denialof-service or degrading performance. As PyVerilog generates CDFGs for single-procedure Verilog files, each design must first be flattened to a single procedure.
Control-flow and data-flow analysis is performed on these flattened benchmarks to generate CDFGs. Information regarding nodes and edges, isolated nodes, conditional and directed edges etc. are extracted as features by converting categorical data derived from CDF analysis to an adjacency matrix representation, which is binary encoded as the input to the AIS training procedure, as shown in Figure 1 .
Specifically, we encode the graph as follows: 1) We denote the structure type (input, output, reg, or wire) as a 2-bit type string. This highlights certain node types for the learning procedure. 2) We then use the adjacency matrix to append an m-bit edge connectivity string derived from a single row of the matrix, where "0" indicates an edge does not exist between two nodes, and "1" indicates an edge does exist. The length of this string is equal to the number of nodes in the graph, m. Nodes with no outgoing edges (isolated nodes) have an edge connectivity string of all 0's. 3) Appended to this is another string which indicates conditions that trigger a change in control flow. This is referred to as a condition-based edge connectivity string as shown in 2. We can account for conditions such as 'greater-than', 'less-than' or 'not equal to', etc. 4) Finally, we can generalize the condition-based edge connectivity string by compressing it into a count of the number of edges for each type of condition. This is referred to as the condition frequency string. This format is summarized in Figure 2 . Node and edge information are essential feature in CDFGs as their connectivity depicts differences in benign and malicious behavior. For example, as Trojan-inserted code essentially contains hidden characteristics, connectivity is generally indistinct whereas benign code is unambiguous and exhibits dynamic connectivity.
B. AIS Training & Testing Methodology
In this section, we describe AIS design, training, and testing procedures, as well as the RTL Trojan dataset used.
1) Benchmarks:
The training and testing data used in our experiments were taken from TrustHub. An overview of the types of examples found in this repository and used in our paper can be found in Table I . The training is done as a leave-one-out cross validation, i.e. we train on all but one type of circuit in our benchmarks and test it on the remaining benchmark. This is done for all benchmark circuit types so that we have n AIS detectors for n circuit types. For example, we train one AIS on all circuit types except for AES, and the AES circuit examples would then be used in the testing phase, and for a second AIS, we train on all circuit types except MC8051 and the MC8051 circuit examples would then be used in the AES  21  21  MC8051  7  7  PIC16F84  4  4  RS232  10  10  wb conmax  2  2  Other  6  0 testing phase, and so on. We therefore train and test on all the benchmarks on batches of examples in a round robin fashion until there is no significant change in accuracy or loss. Leaveone-out cross validation technique, therefore enables testing on unseen benchmarks and as a consequence, the AIS learns a generalization of what makes a circuit a Trojan-inserted design so it can detect unseen cases.
2) Negative Selection Algorithm: The binary-encoded CDFG features are used as input to the AIS. During the censoring phase (i.e. the training phase), the AIS is trained on Trojan-inserted and Trojan-free examples to develop a mature detector set which contains binaries that are detected as nonself. This process is done as follows:
• The program initially reads the benchmark CDFG binaries to create 32-bit binary strings that are used to build the self set (i.e. benign features) from Trojanfree and Trojan-inserted examples. The string length is arbitrarily chosen based on the length of the generated CDFG binaries. Larger string lengths reduce feature loss.
• The self-set is then compared against 32-bit strings of the Trojan-inserted binary encodings to build the detector set. The detector set contains strings from those examples which do not match Trojan-free binary-encoded features.This maturation process is done until all training examples have been given to the AIS.
• After the censoring phase, the detector set is then applied to unseen (i.e. not used for training) binary-encoded CDFG benchmarks to determine whether they are Trojaninserted or Trojan-free. In the censoring phase, either whole or partial string matching may be used to distinguish self from non-self strings. Using partial string matching shortens the time taken in string comparisons.
In our experiments, we tested both to determine whether there is a significant difference in performance. 3) Clonal Selection Algorithm: As per the Clonal Selection process (Section II-B2), we begin by defining the size of our population of antibodies. For our AIS, the generation phase uses a population size of 100, i.e. the randomly generated antibodies, and a memory set containing 50 detector clones. Each antibody (self-example) and antigen (non-self example) is represented by 32-bit length strings. The antibody population set is subjected to an affinity maturation process with the antigen set consisting of 22 Trojan-inserted examples. The memory set is used for classifying unseen cases, as it will contain antibodies which have a high affinity to the antigen (Trojan-inserted) examples.
The cloning rate determines how quickly the highest affinity antibodies are multiplied and reproduced, while the mutation rate is inversely proportional to the affinity of the antibody we are cloning. The higher the affinity, the lesser the effect of the mutation on the clones, such that the quality of the antibody is preserved. This generation process is continued for 50 iterations. For testing, we match the antigens (Trojan-inserted examples) to the memory set of high affinity antibodies for detection. If a string has a high affinity (i.e. high overlap), then it is classified as containing the target unsafe behavior.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS For accurate anomaly detection, we must correctly classify both unsafe and benign behaviors. Errors in the first category, where unsafe behavior is not identified, are false negatives. Errors in the second category, where benign behavior is identified as unsafe, are false positives. We use the terms correctly classified and incorrectly classified to describe true positive/true negative and false positive/false negative rates respectively. All the experiments were run on 64-bit Ubuntu 16.04 with an Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM.
A. AIS Detection Accuracy
Both AIS algorithms demonstrated high accuracy in distinguishing between self and non-self behavior in the test dataset (Tables II and IV) .With NSA partial string matching, a 10 bit fixed length substring from the 32-bit length string is selected and a sliding window is applied which for every iteration moves in position for the censoring and monitoring phases. As observed in Table II , Trojan detection using partial string matching technique has a detection accuracy range of 70% to 100%. For whole string matching, we use the generated 32-bit strings for training and testing. We observe a detection accuracy ranging from 80% to 100% in Table II . For both techniques, we observe an average false negative rate of 12.6% and false positive rate of 14.8%. Table IV shows the detection accuracy of the implemented CSA with an observed average false negative rate of 12.8% and false positive rate of 14.7%. Results are shown in the form of a confusion matrix in tables III and V where TT' and FF' represent the true positives and true negatives (correctly classified as either benign or malicious) whereas FT' and TF' represent false positives and false negatives (incorrectly classified as either benign or malicious) respectively.
B. Analysis
As observed in Table II and IV, our AIS implements the Negative Selection and Clonal Selection Algorithms to 
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efficiently detect the unsafe behavior for which the system was trained -in this case, malicious modifications -in the benchmark circuits test dataset. As with any machine learningbased technique, the accuracy can be improved by providing additional examples of malicious behavior from which the AIS model can learn, as well as AIS parameter tuning. However, in this case, no attempt was made to train the AIS models beyond a general classification of "unsafe behavior" -the specific structure, size, and integration of the Trojan in the RTL was not considered. Thus, we believe the results are promising for detecting generally unsafe behavior in CDFGs. Future work will consider ways to further improve accuracy by tuning some of the detector parameters. For example, in CSA, the population size, the memory size, cloning rate, and mutation rate can all be adjusted, and in NSA, we can tune the size of the substring for partial string matching and compare varying positions of these substrings. False negatives can be further reduced by selecting features most appropriate in classifying self and non-self behavior, training and testing on larger datasets, improving the encoding process etc. Determining the optimal or ideal variables for both NSA and CSA may provide additional insight. Understanding what specific features of the CDFG are best for classification and why these certain features work the best will provide valuable insight into detecting Trojan-like behavior in CDFGs. We also plan to identify other features which can be acquired at design phase and compare their efficacy with those we are currently exploring in this paper. Finally, identifying where the unsafe behavior was detected in the original source would provide hardware designers and system integrators with a valuable tool for improving security of hardware systems during the design stage. 
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel technique for the detection of hardware Trojans in RTL based on high level circuit behavior. We have employed the concept of an Artificial Immune System, a machine learning technique based on biological immune systems which aim to discriminate between self-behavior and non-self behavior. We have used binary-encoded CDFGs extracted from TrustHub RTL Trojan benchmarks for training and testing the AIS. Our results indicate that Negative and Clonal Selection, with their evolutionary-like learning processes, are capable of detecting certain behaviors in CDFGs on which the models were trained, indicating the presence of a Trojan in the hardware description. Future work will focus on improving classification accuracy, and identifying the Trojan class and location in the design.
